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.Editor’s IntroductionWhat is politics? What is art? And how are we to conceive of their intimate and attested interrelation? There are at least two ways of approaching these questions.First, art and politics, qua singular domains of human thought and activity, can be taken as two separate realities, each with its own principle of realization.Politics is so construed, for example, whenever it is defined as a specific form of the exercise of power and its mode of legitimation; so, too, is art, when defined, in modernist or postmodernist terms, on the basis of the ways in which aesthetic specificity has been gradually won by a liberation from the imperatives of mimetic logic.1 From this perspective, the question then arises as to whether these two separate realities can be placed in relation to one another and, if so, under what conditions it ought to happen.Conversely, however, art and politics can be understood, such that their specificity is seen to reside in their contingent suspension of the rules governing normal experience.On this view, their emergence is in no way a necessary outcome of a property that is supposedly inherent to the life of individuals or communities.It depends on an innovative leap from the logic that ordinarily governs human situations.In characterizing politics and aesthetics as forms of dissensus, Rancière seeks to defend a version of this latter alternative.His most general thesis is that what these activities do, each in their own way, is to effect a redistribution of the sensible, that is of the ways in which human communities are ‘spontaneously’ counted as wholes divisible into their constitutive parts and functions.For Rancière, genuine political or artistic activities always involve forms of innovation that tear bodies from their assigned places and free speech and expression from all reduction to functionality.They are forms of creation that are irreducible to the spatio-temporal horizons of a given factual community.In other words, the disruption that they effect is not simply a reordering of the relations of power between existing groups; dissensus is not an institutional overturning.It is an activity that cuts across forms of cultural and identity belonging and hierarchies between discourses and genres, working to introduce new subjects and heterogeneous objects into the field of perception.And as both activities, according to Rancière, have to do with reorienting general perceptual space and disrupting forms of belonging, their interrelation is not a question that needs asking.It can be shown that politics has an inherently aesthetic dimension and aesthetics an inherently political one.Rancière, of course, is not the first to argue that the singularity of these activities lies in their radical challenge to the normal social distribution.What is unique about his theorization, however, is how he conceives of this logic of disruption as a process of equality and consequently also the way he is able to analyze the complicated intertwinings of these two forms of exceptionality.If forms of dissensus are irreducible to the objectivity of the situation, it is by virtue of what Rancière refers to as their forms of egalitarian suspension of the ‘normal’ count of the social order.As stated, the nodal point around which both activities revolve, and which ensures their interrelation, is that both are forms of ‘dissensus’.First, then, it pays to examine the logic of consensus that every dissensus works to disrupt.Consensus, as Rancière understands it, is defined by ‘the idea of the proper’ and the distribution of places of the proper and improper it implies.This logic is, in his view, the spontaneous logic underlying every hierarchy: ‘it is the very idea of the difference between the proper and the improper that serves to separate out the political from the social, art from culture, culture from commerce’ and that defines hierarchical distributions where everyone’s speech is determined in terms of their proper place and their activity in terms of its proper function, without remainder.It consists in the matching of a poeisis or way of doing, with an aisthesis, or horizon of affects.The essence of consensus, then, is the supposition of an identity between sense and sense, between a fact and its interpretation, between speech and its account, between a factual status and an assignation of rights, etc [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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