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Beaumarchais, Pierre Augustin C Figaros Hochzeit oder Der tolle
Bomm, Manfred August Haeberle Kurzschluss
Bomm, Manfred August Haeberle Mundtot
Bomm, Manfred August Haeberle Blutsauger
Bomm, Manfred August Haeberle Trugschluss
DROGA KRZYZOWA O Augustyn Chadam
August McLaughlin In Her Shadow (epub)
Augustinus, Aurelius Bekenntnisse
Brandyjack Augustine Funnell
Berzeretka bez przepisu Krystyna Smigielska

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.And so, debates continued at the heart of the government and in the Chamber of Deputies.This complex network of diplomatic rituals and political decisions linked to national interests and personal rivalries echoed other diplomatic crises at work all across Europe: the general mobilization in Russia, the mobilization of Austria-Hungary declaring war on Serbia, the Kriegsgefahrzustand, or threatening danger of war, declared by Germany, and the ultimatum sent to St.Petersburg.Nevertheless, it is worth telling the story of the diplomatic crisis of August 1 within the French context.It allows us to take into account the unknowns, the uncertainties, and the ambiguities surrounding the decisions made by French leaders, and to explain why these decisions were not always made at an opportune time.To take one example, on the evening of July 31, the German ambassador Baron Wilhelm von Schoen went first to Matignon (the official residence and office of the président du Conseil) in order to warn Viviani of the steps undertaken concerning Russia: several hours earlier, Germany had demanded that Russia stop its mobilization and specified a time frame for the Russian response to this demand.What were the intentions of the French government and how much time had it allowed to decide whether to support its Russian ally in the crisis? This was what von Schoen wanted to know.France was in fact somewhat ill-informed at this hour regarding Russia’s mobilization and plans with regard to Austria-Hungary and Germany.Although Russia had begun to mobilize on July 30, Maurice Paléologue, the French ambassador to Russia, did not warn his government until midmorning of July 31, with a dispatch sent via Bergen in Norway.The contents of the dispatch did not reach Viviani until that evening.At the same moment, the Council of Ministers was holding an urgent meeting, where they were especially preoccupied by the news of Jaurès’s assassination and by the political consequences that might arise from his death.Why had Paléologue taken more than twenty-four hours to notify Paris? Historians have long emphasized the French ambassador’s responsibility in aggravating the diplomatic crisis—without, however, explaining the reasons for this unusual delay.We now tend to think that Russian leaders were keeping him out of the loop.In any case, during the meeting with Baron von Schoen on the evening of July 31, the French were only partially informed of the situation in Russia.Moreover, when they did learn of the Russian mobilization, they wanted to believe that it was in response to the general mobilization decreed previously by Austria-Hungary, although chronology indicates exactly the opposite.It was indeed St.Petersburg that mobilized first, followed by Vienna and then Berlin.Several months later, when Viviani chose to publish the diplomatic dispatches of summer 1914 in order to justify himself, his account of the successive mobilizations relied on this official version: “Because of Austria’s general mobilization and the mobilization measures that Germany has secretly but continuously undertaken for six days, the order of general mobilization has been issued to the Russian army, since Russia cannot, without the greatest danger, be caught unprepared.… For pressing strategic reasons, the Russian government, knowing that Germany was arming, could no longer delay converting its partial mobilization into a general one.” It is easy to imagine that von Schoen and Viviani were talking past each other when they met on the evening of July 31.The former referred to war only as a danger—the meaning of the state of Kriegsgefahrzustand that Germany had just declared—and not as a given or as an intention on the part of his country; the latter, not having yet received official notification of the Russian mobilization, asked for time to reflect.The ambassador then got up from his armchair and declared to the président du Conseil, “If I am forced to leave Paris, I count on you to be so good as to facilitate my departure.” Then, moving to get his hat, von Schoen requested that Viviani provide him the necessary papers to leave the French capital as quickly as possible.Stunned, the head of the government reminded him that the Austrian ambassador was still in Paris and that this decision to leave hastily, without orders, could have grave consequences.Pierre de Margerie, the director of political affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, turned toward von Schoen at that moment: “You have given proof of moderation throughout your entire career—you cannot end your career with bloodshed.” Von Schoen said nothing at first, but then he agreed to come back for a reply to the question of French support to Russia.A new meeting was scheduled for the next day.Early in the morning of Saturday, August 1, a specially convened meeting of the Council of Ministers was held at the Élysée.At 11 o’clock, Viviani had to leave in order to meet with Baron von Schoen, who was waiting for him at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Clearly, the German ambassador had decided, this time, to act as if he sought appeasement.He assured the président du Conseil of his attachment to France and that all his efforts would go toward preserving peace.There was no longer any question of the time frame for a final date or of obtaining papers to leave.Von Schoen sought above all to justify his country’s position in reminding Viviani that it was Russia who had accelerated the crisis by mobilizing.Was it still possible to lean on St.Petersburg and to avoid war? Moreover, was Berlin resolved to go to war? The historian Pierre Renouvin has shed some important light on these questions.15 As he explains, in the unlikely event that France would have chosen to remain neutral, the German government had decided to ask for the return of the fortresses of Toul and Verdun as a guarantee: an unacceptable demand in the eyes of the French, and one that would have made war inevitable.16 The text of Germany’s ultimatum to Belgium was ready, and it had been sent to the German representative in Belgium by July 29 [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]